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NEGLECT OF THE MARKETPLACE: THE
QUESTIONABLE ECONOMICS OF AMERICA'S
BISHOPS
WALTER BLOCK*
The overwhelming majority of the points made in this
assessment of the first draft of the U.S. bishops' pastoral,
"Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy,"1 shall be
critical; indeed, highly critical. It therefore behooves us to
begin by considering the positive elements of the bishops'
pastoral, before examining its shortcomings.
I. POSITIVE ELEMENTS
A. Moral Courage
High on any possible listing of the praiseworthy aspects
of the bishops' pastoral is surely the moral courage it took to
contemplate this project, research the issues, and publish the
first draft. Moral courage, moreover, pervades every nook
and cranny of this document. The bishops have a point of
view, a strong one, and they do not hesitate to deliver their
message in a forthright and even forceful manner.2
The bishops had anticipated that this pastoral letter
would unleash a torrent of abuse;' this expectation was not
disappointed. But even they may not have realized the level
of vilification that their missive would call forth. A survey of
* Senior Economist, The Fraser Institute, Vancouver, British Co-
lumbia, and Director of its Centre for the Study of Economics and
Religion.
1. See National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic Social
Teaching and the U.S. Economy (First Draft 1984), reprinted in 14 ORIGINS.
337 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Pastoral Letter].
2. Several of the bishops' critics have noted this forceful style of
presentation and have objected to it, calling for a softer, more muted mode
of expression. In particular, they have called upon the bishops to express
their findings with more "humility." See, e.g., Krauthammer, Perils of the
Profit Motive, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 1984 at 10, reprinted in CHALLENGE
AND RESPONSE: CRITIQUES OF THE CATHOLIC BISHOPS' DRAFT LETTER ON THE
U.S. ECONOMY 48 (R. Royal ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE AND
RESPONSE].
3. See The Church and Capitalism: A Report by Catholic Bishops on the
U.S. Economy Will Cause a Furor, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 12, 1984, at 104 [herein-
after cited as The Church and Capitalism].
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the reaction reveals the following commentaries: "palpable
nonsense,"' "moralistic drivel," 5 and "meddling."" "Hypoc-
risy" was the most popular charge, mentioned on literally
dozens of occasions in the literature that is beginning to
spring up in response to the bishops' pastoral. The Catholic
Church, it appears from this criticism, has not yet put its own
house fully in order, and should hold its tongue until it does
so-and does so perfectly. 7 For example, the economy pas-
toral advocates massive income transfers from rich to poor,
and yet the Church itself remains a wealthy institution.' The
bishops are also castigated for hypocrisy on the grounds that
they have not applied their views promoting unions, equal
pay, and affirmative action to employees of the Catholic
church.*
There are several ways to refute these charges. First of
all, the bishops themselves admit that the Church, too, is an
economic actor, albeit an imperfect one, and that as such, it
too should struggle1" to incorporate the teachings of the bish-
ops' pastoral into its own behavior." This includes the recog-
nition of the rights of Church employees to organize for pur-
poses of collective bargaining. The bishops state, "the church
would be justly accused of hypocrisy and scandal were any of
4. Seligman, The View From Up High, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 1984, at
149.
5. Bandow, On Matters of Economics, The Pope is All Too Fallible, The
Register, Oct. 12, 1984, at 52.
6. Bush, Challenging Consciences: Archbishop Weakland Talks About the
Bishops' Pastoral, 102 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 246 (1985).
7. Robert McAfee Brown very properly states that the charge of
hyprocrisy can be successfully refuted by changes in the economic manage-
ment of the Church (so as to conform with the pastoral letter) that are
"simultaneous rather than sequential." Brown, On Getting Ready for the
Bishops' Pastoral Letter, 101 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 927 (1984).
8. See Greeley, A "Radical" Dissent, in CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE,
supra note 2, at 33; Rueda, The Bishops' Tired Old Solution, Chicago Trib-
une, Nov. 27, 1984, at 11.
Tom Bethell has launched what can only be considered an overly
harsh-not to say scurrilous-attack on the Catholic bishops for holding a
conference in the sumptuous Washington, D.C. Hilton. Bethell, Hilton Spir-
ituality, AM. SPECTATOR, Jan. 1985, at 7.
9. See Greeley, supra note 8, at 44; Goldman, The Church and the
Poor, N.Y. Times, June 17, 1985, at AI5, col. 2.
10. This admission is certainly further evidence of the modesty and
humility which can be found in the pastoral letter.
11. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, paras. 143-50. See National Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops, Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy pa-
ras. 319-28 (Second Draft 1985), reprinted in 15 ORIGINS 257 (1985) [here-
inafter cited as Second Draft].
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its agencies to try to prevent the organization of unions
. ,,. 2 And according to Archbishop Weakland, the chair-
man of the committee which prepared the pastoral, "the let-
ter 'will not be credible' without an examination of the
church's role in the economy including its relationships with
employees .... ""
It is perfectly true that people will tend to disbelieve the
bishops' pastoral unless the Church's acts begin to conform
with its teachings. However, there is a far more basic refuta-
tion of the charge of hypocrisy available to the bish-
ops-showing that all such complaints are merely variants of
the ad hominum argument, an informal fallacy in logic.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the bishops
were indeed hypocritical, saying one thing and doing an-
other. Even so, this is all beside the point. Our task here is to
evaluate the truth of the bishops' pastoral, and the economic
activities of the bishops are entirely irrelevant to the veracity
of their letter. Einstein's theories were correct, even though
he might not have been able to balance his checkbook. Simi-
larly, the correctness of the bishops' pastoral (or lack of same)




Secondly, the bishops are to be congratulated upon their
refusal to bow down to demands that they impose restrictions
on their right of free speech. Several reasons were presented
to silence the bishops. One common criticism is that the bish-
ops lack economic expertise. 4 This argument is so compel-
ling that even Robert McAfee Brown, an able defender of
the bishops' pastoral, accepted it when he conceded that,
apart from the fact that the bishops held hearings with ex-
perts in all parts of the country, it could be suggested that
they were "venturing beyond their depth.""'
12. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 148. See Brown, Appreciating
the Bishops' Letter, 102 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 129 (1985).
13. Goldman, supra note 9, at A 15, col. 2.
14. Greeley, supra note 8, at 33; Langan, Benestad, Warwick & No-
vak, Four Views of the Bishops' Pastoral, the Lay Letter, and the U.S. Economy,
THIS WORLD, Winter 1985, at 99, 102 [hereinafter cited as Four Views]; Spe-
cial Report on Catholic Bishops and American Economics, in RELIGION & SOC'Y
REP., Mar. 1985; at 5 [hereinafter cited as Special Report].
15. See Brown, supra note 7, at 927.
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But this is nonsense. First of all, the argument from lack
of expertise, like its colleague, the charge of hypocrisy, is an
argumentum ad hominem, and therefore fallacious. The bish-
ops may lack expertise, they may even be functionally illiter-
ate, and yet the economy pastoral may still be correct in all
its claims. The credentials of the authors are entirely irrele-
vant to the truth of their product, and this alone is our
concern.
Further, it is by no means clear that the bishops lack ex-
pertise in economics. True, none of them have a Ph.D. in
economics, but when did this become the criterion of exper-
tise? There are numerous renowned economists-such as
Adam Smith, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill in the days of
yore, and Gordon Tullock and David Friedman in the mod-
ern era-who cannot boast of an advanced degree in the dis-
cipline. Should we go to the ludicrous extreme of setting up a
licensing authority, which would prohibit all but duly "quali-
fied" persons from advancing their opinions on economic
matters?"6
Then, too, there is the fact that the bishops' pastoral
closely resembles the works of presumably "expert" econo-
mists, such as Robert Heilbroner, Robert Lekachman, and
John Kenneth Galbraith. If these writers are economic ex-
perts, and the bishops' pastoral is comparable to their publi-
cations, on this criterion, we must grant that the bishops have
as much expertise as these other laborers in the vineyards of
economics.
2. Trespass
Next, we consider the view that the bishops should hold
their tongues because they do not have a "mandate" to speak
out on economic issues. Peter L. Berger charges as follows:
"A common assumption of democracy is that no one has a
'mandate' (prophetic or otherwise) to speak for people who
have not elected him as their spokesman; the Catholic bish-
ops of the United States have not been elected by any constit-
uency of poor people. 1 7 Lawler speaks of "trespass" in this
regard: "The Catholic tradition involves a clear division of
labor: bishops are to proclaim general moral principles; the
political chore of enacting those principles falls to Catholic
16. For a critique of licensing in the health field, see R. HAMOWY,
CANADIAN MEDICINE: A STUDY IN RESTRICTED ENTRY (1984).




laymen. So when the bishops endorse specific public policies,
they are trespassing on the layman's territory."18
But the bishops have anticipated this objection. In their
conclusion, they warn against a "spiritually schizophrenic ex-
istence" in which, in effect, people apply their moral and reli-
gious precepts on the Sabbath-but not during the rest of
the week. 9 Were the bishops to "stick to their knitting," e.g.,
confine themselves to discussing proper Sabbath behavior,
they would only be exacerbating this unfortunate bifurcation.
If this is what the division of labor requires, then so much the
worse for the division of labor.2 0
3. Harm
But the litany of irrelevant criticism has by no means
been exhausted. There is also the widespread claim that the
bishops' pastoral will do irreparable harm to this or that goal,
and therefore never should have been written. Negative con-
sequences include the "squandering of moral authority, ' ' 2 .
and "encouraging class conflict" or "divisiveness. ' 22 With re-
gard to the former, critics must realize that to the extent that
the bishops' moral authority exists (and it is formidable in the
United States, as evidenced by the attention devoted to the
bishops' pastoral), it is the bishops' private property, to do
18. Lawler, At Issue Is the Prophet Motive, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1984,
at 32, col. 1.
19. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 330. See also id. paras. 321-23,
325; Second Draft, supra note 11, para. 330.
20. Brown criticizes the Lawler argument on the ground that "it
presupposes a falsely dualistic view of the world, gnostic, docetic or
whatever, radically sundering religion and daily life." Brown, supra note 7,
at 927. Therefore, the bishops should be allowed, nay, encouraged to
speak out on economic affairs. Yet Brown's collegiality, curiously enough,
does not extend to the publication of the lay letter. See Lay Commission on
Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, Toward the Future: Catho-
lic Social Thought and the U.S. Economy - A Lay Letter, CATHOLICISM IN CRI-
sis, Nov. 1984, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Lay Letter]. In a vituperative dis-
missal of that document, Brown calls it a "spectacle," urges us to "ignore"
it, and casts aspersions on the theological expertise of its authors. This
comes with particular ill-grace from a person who has severely criticized
credentialism when applied to the bishops by their detractors.
21. Von Geusau, Are the Bishops "Squandering Their Authority?, CA-
THOLICISM IN CRISIS, Mar. 1985, at 17.
22. Reed, God Is Not a Socialist, ANSWERS TO ECON. PROBLEMS, Jan.
1985, at 1. Says Michael Novak, "Is it right to divide the church along
political lines? Should not the bishops stand above factions?" Novak, The
Two Catholic Letters on the U.S. Economy, in CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE, supra
note 2, at 32.
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with as they wish. They earned it; they own it. If the higher
Church authorities had so little confidence in the men who
presently occupy the U.S. bishophric, as implied by this
"friendly" criticism, the bishops presumably would be
replaced."
23. It may appear unseemly for a non-Catholic such as the present
writer to presume to comment on the appropriateness of the U.S. bishops
speaking out on economics. Protocol might indicate discreet silence as the
best policy. But to succumb to this temptation would be to violate a canon
of social science according to which truth or falsity is the criterion of judg-
ment, and the person or antecedents of the analyst are strictly irrelevant.
An interesting interchange on this matter goes as follows:
Paul Heyne: I hope we can all agree that sociological criticisms of
ideas are both useful and dangerous. They are useful because
ideas do have causes. And they are dangerous because such criti-
cisms too easily degenerate into ignoring the validity of the ideas
and concentrating on ad hominem attacks and assumed motives. I
think this applies to both sides in the general discussion in which
we are engaged. It's easy for defenders of capitalism, such as my-
self, to ignore the clerical critics, such as Gregory Baum, by claim-
ing that everything they say is a result of status anxiety. And it's
easy for the clerical critics of capitalism to dismiss, or heavily dis-
count, the arguments of economists who are, I think, the principal
formulators of arguments to defend capitalism. It's much too easy
for them to dismiss these arguments on the grounds that, well, all
social scientists operate in some kind of value framework.
Now, having said that it's both useful and dangerous, what fol-
lows from it? I think one thing, maybe, follows from it. Sociological
explanations should only be provided by people for those movements in
which they, themselves, participate. Don't do it to your enemies. Do it to
yourself
Milton Friedman: May I just interject that I think that's utterly
wrong. I don't want to be in a position where I say, 'I only want a
physician to advise me on cancer if he's had cancer.' I think soci-
ologists ought to study whatever sociologists study.
MORALITY OF THE MARKET: RELIGIOUS AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 387-88
(1985) (emphasis added). In a similar vein, James Schall, states:
[Consider] the propriety of criticizing Catholic popes and bishops
for positions they take on economics or politics. It seems to me
that one ought to ask oneself first, to what audience are we talking
when we are talking about criticizing a pope or a bishop or even a
lowly Jesuit. (laughter) What is the audience? If it is the university
audience, if it is an academic audience, the presupposition is intel-
lectual; the presumption is one of integrity and freedom. And the
Catholic church, it seems to me, historically; and indeed in practi-
cally any document in which this issue is discussed, has always
taken the following position: that it is important and vital for peo-
ple who disagree, whether they be within the church or Protes-
tants, Jews, Muslims, whatever they may be, and this includes total
non-believers, to state fairly and correctly and as bluntly as they
wish what their problems are with the position of the Catholic
[Vol. 2
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But let us suppose for the moment that the critics' fears
are well placed (as shall be argued below) and that the bish-
ops' pastoral will tend to compromise the moral authority of
the U.S. bishops. Would it really have been better if the bish-
ops' pastoral had not been written? Given that the pastoral is
an accurate portrayal of the bishops' thoughts (there is no
reason to doubt this), is it not far better that their true
thoughts on these matters see the light of day, and be criti-
cized in honest and open dialogue, rather than be suppressed
out of fear? In other words, if the moral authority of the
bishops is so reduced by the economy pastoral, is it not bet-
ter, more open and honest (even from the point of view of
their loyal opposition) that they lose this benefit, to which
they are not entitled in any case? And with regard to the
"harm" of divisiveness, Robert McAfee Brown offers two
worthwhile responses. First, he points out, reasonably
enough, "church unity can be bought at too high a price."
Second, he states, "truth emerges in the course of creative
exchange. "24
4. Catholic Economies
Another presumed reason for the bishops to maintain a
dignified silence on economic issues is the poor development
record of "Catholic" nations. As Charles Krauthammer
states, "Catholicism's historical record as a frame for eco-
nomic development is not particularly encouraging. One has
only to compare Protestant North America to Catholic South
and Central America, or Quebec (before it declericalized it-
self in the 1960's) to the rest of Canada, to make the point
gently. No one has yet accused the Catholic ethic of being a
church, or with a given individual in the church.
To do this, in my view, is not in any sense to insult the dignity
or the stature or the status of the person or the author to whom
you are addressing yourself. Now it is obviously possible, even for
a professor, to be unfair and snide and bitter. We know that hap-
pens. But in general, an honest man says, "I have read the posi-
tion of the Catholic church," it seems to me, and within the tradi-
tion of the intellectual integrity of which they ought to be obliged,
one should say, "I appreciate very much the honour you do to us,
to me, to state what you hold and why you hold it." And in the
context of academic freedom and intellectual integrity, one can
respond to that.
Schall, Ethical Reflections on the Economic Crisis, in THEOLOGY, THIRD WORLD
DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE 83-84 (1985).
24. Brown, supra note 7, at 928.
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source of economic dynamism. '2 5 Brown's reply to this ef-
frontery is so good it deserves repetition (almost) in full:
If the premise is correct that the Catholic Church has a
bad track record in this regard, that is all the more reason
to tackle the subject matter and begin to set things straight,
so that errors will not be perpetuated. The bishops surely
owe the faithful at least that. The argument also assumes,
curiously, that the church in so-called "Catholic nations"
determines whether the economic system works efficiently.
This will be news to . . . a great many Third World
bishops.' 26
5. Motive Mongering
The last group of attacks on the bishops' letter attempts
to account for the waywardness of this document in terms of
special-and rather peculiar-motivations ascribed to its au-
thors. The pastoral's great reliance on the state, in prefer-
ence to the marketplace, allegedly springs from the fact that
the Catholic Church is organized along hierarchical lines, the
ones most conducive to and reminiscent of the public sec-
tor." Another "real" reason behind the creation of the bish-
ops' pastoral is the fact that if its policy prescriptions are fol-
lowed, that is, if the United States moves from capitalism to
socialism, the bishops will have a greater role to play in soci-
ety."8 The bishops' pastoral is also explained in terms of the
monastic background of Archbishop Weakland. 9 And, you
had better be sitting down for this one, the bishops' pastoral
has taken on a leftish tinge because the conference of bishops
is located in Washington, D.C."
25. Krauthammer, supra note 2, at 10.
26. Brown, supra note 7, at 928.
27. See The Bishops and Economic Democracy, RELIGION & Soc'Y REP.,
Jan. 1985, at 5; Krauthammer, supra note 2, at 10; Novak, Toward Consen-
sus: Suggestions for Revising the First Draft, Part I, CATHOLICISM IN CRISIS,
Mar. 1985, at 7, 13.
28. This view was ascribed to Fortune by the New York Times, which
stated: "socialism gives them [the bishops] a role to play, while capitalism
- reliance on imperfect market forces - leaves them out in the cold."
Kennedy, America's Activist Bishops, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1984, Magazine,
at 14, 17.
29. See id. at 24.
30. George Will put forth this novel hypothesis quite seriously. Will,
God's Liberal Agenda, in CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE, supra note 2, at 68. Isn't
it amazing that the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Founda-
tion, the Ethics & Public Policy Center, the Mises Institute, the Cato Insti-
[Vol. 2
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One difficulty with all this motive-mongering is that it is
exceedingly difficult to know whether the correct explanation
has been reached. How, after all, would one determine
whether or not the bishops' letter can best be understood as
monasticism, or hierarchy writ large? The major problem,
however, is that motivation is irrelevant to the truth or falsity
of the pastoral, which must be our main concern.
This section can best be concluded by two polar opposite
views on the propriety of the bishops speaking out on eco-
nomics. According to Archbishop Weakland, "the church's
position [is] that no area of life is exempt from moral evalua-
tion and judgment."'" In contrast, von Geusau, a theologian
from the Netherlands, claims, "Only in exceptional circum-
stances-such as the bishops of Poland encounter-should
bishops address themselves to governments with policy rec-
ommendations. '"32 Little accommodation is possible between
these two statements. One pictures the church as an ostrich,
with its head in the sand, the other as an eagle, soaring on
high, unafraid to look at all beneath it. It is difficult to under-
stand how such different visions could be urged upon the
church by two of its sons.
C. Moral Indignation
The third positive element of the bishops' pastoral is its
sense of outrage; the bishops are not cold and dispassionate
in their treatment of the U.S. economy. There is injustice in
the business world, there are victims in the economic
sphere, 3 and when these problems are recognized in the
course of discussion, it is almost incumbent upon any analysis
with a strong moral dimension to express at least a measure
of indignation.
In this respect, the bishops' pastoral strongly contrasts to
the Lay Commission's letter.34 If the former can be described
as passionate or distressed, the latter can be called bloodless,
analytical or even unfeeling. Such, at least, is the verdict ren-
tute and hundreds of other organizations have managed to maintain a sem-
blance of support for the marketplace, despite their location in that den of
socialist iniquity, Washington, D.C.?
31. Bush, supra note 6, at 248.
32. Von Geusau, supra note 21, at 19.
33. It shall be argued below that the bishops have failed to under-
stand the injustice which exists in the economy, and while they have cor-
rectly identified some of the victims, i.e., the poor, they have misconstrued
the reason for making this claim.
34. Lay Letter, supra note 20.
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dered by both supporters and detractors of each document.
For example, according to James Hitchcock,
The bishops' letter does convey a certain sense of moral ur-
gency, insisting that dire poverty and injustice are unaccept-
able to Christians, and its greatest strength is its unflinching
insistence that every kind of public policy must be rigor-
ously scrutinized with regard to its affects [sic] on the poor.
By contrast, the lay committee's letter can be regarded as
somewhat speculative . . ..
D. Preferential Option for the Poor
The bishops are to be congratulated for making the wel-
fare of the poor a bedrock of their moral and economic anal-
ysis. In doing so, they redirect public consciousness toward an
examination of the causes and cures of poverty, and this can
only be for the good. In future studies of society, thanks to
the bishops' pastoral, it shall be exceedingly difficult to avoid
the perspective of the last, least and lost amongst us; com-
mentators shall be led, by the very visible hand of the bish-
ops, to ask of each proposed policy: What are its implications
for the poor?
This doctrine, however, must not be misinterpreted. We
must not conclude that justice can be fully satisfied by a fair
treatment of the poor. Surely there is more to justice than
35. Hitchcock, Two Views on the Economy: A Comparison of the Bishops'
and Lay Commission's Letters, CATHOLICISM IN CRISIS, Feb. 1985, at 7, 9.
Archbishop Weakland similarly claimed: "The letter by the Lay Commis-
sion ... contains absolutely no urgency .... Bush, supra note 6, at 246.
And according to Donald Warwick,
The letter, in my view, shows no great urgency about doing any-
thing different. The lay letter does not seem to be really too wor-
ried about the extent of poverty, too worried about the extent of
unemployment. It's concerned about the poor, but there is not a
sense of urgency in the letter. Indeed, I would argue that there is
a sense of complacency, that things are going along pretty well
and we shouldn't really do too much to upset too many apple carts
too quickly. This is my interpretation. I may be wrong. If I am, I
am sure Michael Novak will correct me.
Four Views, supra note 14, at 111. Novak's reply to this statement contains
no correction, so one can only deduce that even he agrees with the assess-
ment made in the text. Novak only mentions this issue twice. First, he
states "probably the most significant difference [between the lay letter and
the bishops' pastoral] lies in the tone, attitude . . . of the two treatments."
Secondly, he states that the bishops' letter begins in an "accusatory voice."
Id. at 112. If anything, these utterances support Warwick's claim.
[Vol. 2
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proper treatment for the poverty stricken.
The preferential option for the poor, properly inter-
preted, may be a necessary condition for justice, but it is
hardly a sufficient one.$6 In this regard, the statement of this
option in the lay letter is preferable to that in the bishops'
pastoral. According to the former, "one measure of a good
society is how well it cares for the weakest and most vulnera-
ble of its members.""7 In the bishops' view, "the justice of a
community is measured by its treatment of the powerless in
society."3 8
Another caveat: We cannot interpret the preferential op-
tion for the poor as carte blanche for those with low incomes,
vis-A-vis the wealthy. For example, only the opposite of justice
is served if a person who inhabits territory south of the pov-
erty line robs at gunpoint a rich but honest man. 9
Consider two other misstatements of this option: "The
needs of the poor take priority over the desires of the
rich,' 40 and "this principle grants priority to meeting funda-
mental human needs over the fulfillment of desires for luxury
consumer goods or for profits that do not ultimately benefit
real common good of the community."4 Paul Heyne has
quite properly criticized these misinterpretations as follows:
"This is perilously close to pure demagoguery. Is the govern-
ment supposed to call a halt to all skiing (surely a luxury) un-
til everyone in the society is receiving a sound education
(deemed a necessity by the bishops)? If it doesn't mean some-
thing like this, what does it mean . . .?42
E. Exploitation
One of the most magnificent aspects of the economy pas-
36. Brown, supra note 12, at 129. It would appear that Brown has
failed to give sufficient weight to this distraction.
37. Lay Letter, supra note 20 at 58 (emphasis added).
38. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 43. See Second Draft, supra
note 11, para. 44.
39. This point was made in a critique of the pastoral letter on the
economy written by the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, "Ethical
Reflections on the Economic Crisis." W. BLOCK, Focus: ON ECONOMICS AND
THE CANADIAN BISHOPS 5-6 (1983).'40. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 106 (quoting John Paul II,
Address on Christian Unity in a Technological Age, 14 ORIGINS 248 (1984)). See
Second Draft, supra note 11, para. 95.
41. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 103.
42. P. HEYNE, THE U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS AND THE PURSUrr OF JUS-
TICE I I (Cato Policy Analysis No. 50, 1985).
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toral is its keen sense of awareness that the U.S. economy
contains numerous instances of exploitation. Even more im-
portant, the bishops are cognizant of the fact that where
there is economic injustice, there must be, and indeed are,
perpetrators of such injustice! This insight is so profound,
and the bishops are to be congratulated upon it even more,
given that two of their main neo-conservative detractors not
only missed it, but took great pains to distance themselves
from it.
43
Of course, the bishops have only touched the tip of the
iceberg. In point of fact, there are literally hundreds of pro-
grams which subsidize, protect or regulate the rich and upper
middle class to their benefit, and to the detriment of the
more populous lower middle class and poor. "Corporate wel-
fare bums" is a phrase that neatly summarizes the welter of
bailouts, licensing arrangements, guarantees, restrictive entry
provisions, tariffs and other protections, union legislation,
and minimum wage laws which effectively transfer vast sums
of money from the threadbare pockets of the poor to the er-
mine-wrapped coffers of the rich and relatively well-to-do.
But Michael Novak, for one, is having none of this. In
his view, the bishops' use of the term "marginalization" sug-
gests a deliberate policy-people being driven to the mar-
gins; or at least an intention to keep people visible or out of
sight. 4 "Correlatively, in speaking of the poor, the draft
tends to look at the poor as passive victims . . . ."" He con-
tinues, "But the implied image [in the bishops' pastoral] of
the economy is that of a . . . managed economy, whose 'pri-
orities' are set by experts standing outside the system and di-
recting it consciously from above.""'
Contrary to the claim of Novak, however, these views of
the bishops are all correct. Anyone who seriously contends
that the poor are not "held back" and "done to" has some-
how failed to take into account the work of numerous econo-
43. The two, as we shall see below, are Michael Novak, author of
numerous treatises on economics, and Paul Heyne, a professional econo-
mist, and author of a best-selling university textbook, The Economic Way of
Thinking. This is not by a long shot the first time non-economists such as
the bishops have eclipsed professional economists, but it certainly gives
pause for thought to those who have rejected the pastoral letter on
grounds of credentialism.
44. Novak, supra note 27, at 12. See also Four Views, supra note 14,
at 112.
45. Novak, supra note 27, at 8.
46. Id. at 13.
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mists who have shown, in detail, just how a deliberative and
interventionist government has chained, despoiled, oppressed
and violated the rights of millions of poor people in the
United States. In The State Against Blacks, for instance, Walter
Williams demonstrates how minimum wage and union legisla-
tion, taxicab licensing systems, and street vendor laws-
passed by legislators with due deliberation-deprive
thousands of poor citizens of a livelihood.4 But we need not
seek elsewhere for studies which show the deleterious effects
of government intervention in the economy on the poor. The
numerous books of Michael Novak brilliantly show this over
and over again.' 8
Paul Heyne is another critic of the bishops' letter who,
for some inexplicable reason, turns his back on a brilliant ca-
reer of demonstrating that government interference nega-
tively impacts the poor. Heyne, too, takes the bishops to task
for claiming that the poor are suffering from the activities of
other, more powerful people:
[T]he actual unemployment rate is the outcome of a social
system rather than anyone's direct goal, it cannot be re-
duced in the way that we reduce a thermostat setting or the
height of the kitchen shelf.
Throughout the [bishops' pastoral], the poor, the unem-
ployed and the 'marginalized' are presented as persons
compelled by forces beyond their control.
[I]n an economic system, results are not intended. Or, to
put it another way, the results that emerge are not the re-
sults that were intended by the people who produced
them."
As in the case of Novak, Heyne's other writings contra-
dict the above critique of the bishops' pastoral. For example,
47. W. WILLIAMS, THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS (1982). This book
comes especially to mind because Walter Williams is listed as one of those
who gave testimony to the Lay Commission on Catholic Social Teaching
and the U.S. Economy, in its preparation of the lay letter. See Lay Letter,
supra note 20, at 88.
48. See generally M. NOVAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM
(1982); M. NOVAK, THE CORPORATION: A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY (1981); CAP-
ITALISM AND SOCIALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY (M. Novak ed. 1979); No-
vak, A Theology of Development for Latin America, in ON LIBERATION THEOL-
oGY (R. Nash ed. 1984).
49. P. HEYNE, supra note 42, at 3-4, 8.
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Heyne has elsewhere found that unemployment can be re-
duced by direct action (by repealing the minimum wage law),
which is as deliberate as adjusting a thermostat. 0
Novak and Heyne make two claims against the bishops.
First, the poor are not helpless, or victimized, or compelled
by more powerful forces. This, we have seen, must be re-
jected, based on evidence supplied not only by the economic
profession in general, but also by the individual contributions
of Novak and Heyne. Their second claim, however, is more
difficult to refute. Here, Novak and Heyne deny the charge
of the bishops that the destruction visited on the poor by and
through government is "intended," "goal-directed," "fault-
worthy," "deliberate," "consciously directed" and constitutes
"positive oppression."
This claim cannot be rejected so easily; neo-classical eco-
nomics deals mainly with results of human action, not with
the internal mind-states of the perpetrators."' The issue is a
matter of common sense, and here the bishops have it all
over their two critics. Let us stipulate, for the sake of argu-
ment, that minimum wage laws raise the unemployment rates
of teenage black males to astronomical levels, that union leg-
islation discriminates against the downtrodden, that Chrysler-
type bailouts benefit the rich at the expense of the poor, that
tariffs and other trade interferences victimize those at the
bottom of the economic pyramid, and that taxi licensing laws
freeze the poor out of ownership positions. Can one seriously
contend that all the professional economists and lawyers who
nevertheless advocate such policies, the bureaucrats who ad-
minister them, and the politicians who enact them, do so in
blissful ignorance of their effects? If not, there is at least one
person in the United States who intends to harm the poor,
and presumably many more. In any case, if economics must
remain forever silent on the question of motivation, how is it
that Novak and Heyne are so sure that none of these depre-
dations on the poor are "directed," or "deliberate?"
These two critics speak as if the U.S. economy were pres-
ently one of laissez-faire capitalism. If, and only if, there were
a full free market in operation, their claims would be true;
50. P. HEYNE, THE ECONOMIC WAY OF THINKING 229-30 (4th ed.
1983).
51. In contrast, the Austrian school of economics places purposive
behavior at center stage of its analysis. See, e.g., L. VON MisEs, HUMAN Ac-
TION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (3d ed. 1966); M. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECON-
OMY & STATE (1970).
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then, no one could exploit another (whether purposefully or
not) through the apparatus of the state. But it is inexplicable
that scholars of the mettle of Novak and Heyne should not
be more aware of the activities of the rent-seeking transfer
society,52 which are everywhere around us. The United
States is now a mixed welfare state, one from which the rich
gain in innumerable ways; it is not the free market ststem ad-
vocated by Adam Smith.
F. How Natural is Wealth?
Another incisive point made in the economy pastoral
concerns the question of how natural-or artificial-is
wealth. The bishops take the view that, in the absence of any
barriers to the contrary, the natural lot of mankind is one of
prosperity.
Michael Novak castigates the bishops for this position:
[Tjhe bishops speak . . . as if wealth were the natural con-
dition of human beings. . . . The point of view of the lay
letter, by contrast, is that poverty is a common initial condi-
tion in human history, and that to create wealth, new causes
such as investment, creativity, and entrepreneurship must
be put into operation."
The answer to this dispute will of course depend on how
to precisely define the natural state of affairs. In order to put
the Novak hypothesis in a reasonable light, "nature" must be
defined in terms of a full free enterprise system, that is,
where no prohibitions of any kind over "capitalist acts be-
tween consenting adults ' 54 shall be implemented. Under such
conditions, what is the likely prosperity level of a group of
people lacking all semblance of business sense, economic cre-
ativity, investment funds, or entrepreneurship? And the obvi-
ous answer is, very high, thank you.
Thanks to the "magic of the marketplace, '3 5 such people
do very well, even in America, a land which only very imper-
fectly approaches a free marketplace. There are millions of
lower and middle class Americans whose standard of living is
52. See T. ANDERSON & P. HILL, THE BIRTH OF A TRANSFER SOCIETY
(1980).
53. Four Views, supra note 14, at 112-13.
54. This felicitous phrase was coined by Robert Nozick. R. NozIcK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
55. To use a phrase coined by the greatest free market rhetorician
to have ever become President, Ronald Reagan.
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the envy of the rest of the world, yet who have no funds in-
vested in business, display little creativity in the economic
sense, and have no personal acquaintance whatever with the
entrepreneurial spirit. To be sure, the qualities mentioned by
Novak are also important. But it is necessary only that a mi-
nority of people have them, and this requirement has been
met in virtually every society known to man. The bottleneck
is not entrepreneurship, but rather absence of totalitarian
government which perverts, distorts and grinds down man's
natural inclination toward prosperity and wealth.
G. Dialogue
The bishops call for dialogue on the economic and moral
questions which face us today. This is most welcome. It is by
airing these issues-under the unique perspective offered to
us in the bishops' pastoral-that progress can be made.
The process already seems to be bearing fruit in terms of
promoting discussion." An immense critical literature has
sprung up in the short time since the first draft of the letter.
The consultative procedure which will take place before the
final draft is published will encourage even more reflection.
Donald Warwick, consultant to the bishops' committee,
expresses himself in this matter as follows:
For in the end, what we want in this debate is an opportu-
nity for intelligent people who may have different points of
view on how this country should be organized to express
their views, to be understood with respect by others who
may disagree with those points of view, so that in the end
the Catholic bishops and all the rest of us have an opportu-
nity to issue some intelligent recommendations and to form
some intelligent opinions about what the United States
economy should look like. 7
According to Brown,
The draft is a model of clarity. Its style is both crisp and
passionate, its structure is clear and its documentation is ex-
tensive, drawn not only from church teaching but from a
wide spectrum of contemporary sources. Any notion that
the letter is nothing but a collection of left-wing cliches is
belied not only by the tone, but by the sources cited to sus-
56. See Bush, supra note 6, at 247; Wolfe, We Must Transform Our-
selves First, CATHOLICISM IN CRisis, Feb. 1985, at 10.
57. Four Views, supra note 14, at 111.
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tain the descriptive material in the text.58
The bishops' pastoral does read well, but the widespread rep-
resentation of its sources and consultants along the political
economic spectrum leaves rather much to be desired. Con-
spicuous by their absence are the following eminent public
policy analysts: Martin Anderson, Peter Bauer, Gary Becker,
James Buchanan, William F. Buckley, Harold Demsetz,
Milton Friedman, George Gilder, Henry Hazlitt, Melvyn
Krauss, Irving Kristol, Charles Murray, Robert Nozick,
Michael Novak, Murray Rothbard, George Stigler, Thomas
Sowell, and Gordon Tullock. Hopefully, these advocates of
freer markets will be better represented in the second and
third rounds in the ongoing dialogue.
H. Immorality of Unemployment
One can read numerous economic treatises without ever
once coming across a claim that unemployment is immoral.
Perhaps this is as it should be, given the division of labor
which restricts the dismal science from normative concerns.
Nevertheless, it is like a breath of fresh air to be told in blunt
terms that "current levels of unemployment are morally
unjustified.
59
Thanks to the U.S. bishops, we shall henceforth see not
only the economic, sociological and psychological tragedies of
unemployment, but we shall be able to view this phenomenon
through a moral perspective as well.
There is a fly in the ointment, however. It is one thing to
condemn present unemployment rates as immoral, and to de-
scribe a rate of six to seven percent as "unacceptable, "6 0 but
it is quite another matter to award a passing ethical grade to
unemployment at the three to four percent level.6 At what
point does unemployment pass from "morally unjustified" to
morally acceptable? Thus, the bishops' claim appears to be
rather arbitrary.
A more appropriate analytical device might be to distin-
guish between voluntary and involuntary unemployment.
How can such a distinction be made?
58. Brown, supra note 12, at 129.
59. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, outline, para. 163. See Second
Draft, supra note 11, para. 140. Precedence for this claim, however, be-
longs to the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops. See supra note 39.
60. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 179. See Second Draft, supra
note 11, para. 151.
61. See Berger, supra note 17, at 32-33.
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An employment contract is nothing but a specific type of
trade: one in which the employee gives up leisure and obtains
money, and the employer pays the money and receives labor
services in return. Involuntary or coercive unemployment,
then, is the result of any barrier, such as the threat or actual
use of force, that prevents the consummation of an employ-
ment agreement. Examples include the minimum wage law,
labor legislation which physically prevents the employer from
hiring a strike breaker ("scab"), or union violence to that
same end, as well as taxi and trucking enactments which pro-
hibit contracts for employment. Voluntary unemployment,
on the other hand, consists of joblessness in the absence of
such constraints. For example, a person may be looking for a
job (frictional unemployment), or holding out for a higher
salary than presently offered, or taking an extended vacation.
With this characterization in mind, we can more readily
distinguish between that unemployment which is morally jus-
tified, and that which is not: any coercive unemployment is
immoral, no matter how low, and any voluntary unemploy-
ment, no matter how high, even up to 100% of the labor
force, is morally acceptable.
I. Overpopulation
The last point upon which to congratulate the bishops
pertains to their refusal to be stampeded by the over-popula-
tionists, the Malthusians of the day, 2 into a call for birth con-
trol, whether by abortion63 or not, in order to promote eco-
nomic development.
It has been shown time and time again that there is very
little statistical correlation, or causal relation, between dense
or high population and poverty. True, India is poor and
highly populated, while Kuwait is rich and underpopulated.
On the other hand, there are numerous examples of the op-
posite taking place. For example, there are the "teeming
masses" jammed, sardine-like, into their luxurious dwellings
in Manhattan, Paris, Rome, London, Tokyo and San Fran-
cisco. Alternatively, there are countries where nary a person
can ever be seen-which nonetheless wallow in dire
poverty."
62. See Greeley, supra note 8, at 36; Special Report, supra note 14, at
2.
63. For the present author's views on abortion, see Block, Woman
and Fetus: Rights in Conflict?, REASON, April 1978, at 18.
64. Countries with less than 100 people per square mile-and less
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II. PHILOSOPHY: POSITIVE ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Having noted and duly expounded upon the praisewor-
thy elements of the bishops' pastoral, this section considers
the errors committed by the authors of this document. The
bishops have committed many and serious mistakes of com-
mission and omission, of fact and value, of philosophy and
economics. To prevent any misinterpretation, however, it
must be said that none of these lapses from logic justify a de-
mand that the bishops remain silent. Whose work, after all, is
error free . . . on this side of the Garden of Eden? This sec-
tion begins with the bishops' defense of the doctrine of posi-
tive economic rights.
It is no exaggeration to say that positive economic
"rights" form one of the basic building blocks of the bishops'
entire philosophy. The adherence to this position appears
early in the bishops' pastoral, is repeated on numerous occa-
sions, comprises the mainstay of Section II, Ethical Norms for
Economic Life, and informs much of the discussion in Part
Two, which is devoted to public policy recommendations. For
example, the bishops demand that
[T]he nation must take up the task of framing a new na-
tional consensus that all persons have rights in the eco-
nomic sphere and that society has a moral obligation to take
the necessary steps to ensure that no one among us is hun-
gry, homeless, unemployed, or otherwise denied what is
necessary to live with dignity."5
Several of the bishops' supporters have carried this one
step further, explicitly calling for a new "Economic Bill of
Rights," to supplement that which is already part of the U.S.
Constitution. 6 This concept, however, is deeply flawed, and
even mischievous, as demonstrated by a comparison of the
traditional view of negative rights with the newer variety
urged by the bishops.
In classical philosophy, negative rights or negative liberty
than $1,000 per capita income in 1981-include Colombia, Algeria, Chile,
Guyana, Bolivia, Liberia, Congo, Tanzania, Kenya, Afghanistan and Ethio-
pia. See T. SOWELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF RACE: AN INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 208-17 (1983).
65. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, outline. See also id. paras. 74-89, 90-
150, 258, 273; Second Draft, supra note 11, paras. 67-124, 302, 310-13.
Wolfe has called these sections the "real heart of the pastoral." Wolfe,
supra note 56, at 11.
66. Brown, supra note 12, at 129-30; Novak, supra note 22, at 32.
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consist solely of the right not to have physical force, or the
threat thereof, initiated against oneself. Each person, then,
has the right not to be murdered, raped, robbed, assaulted,
or battered. The doctrine of positive "rights," in contrast,
typically holds that people have the right to food, clothing,
shelter, and, depending on which variant is under discussion,
to a reasonable lifestyle, to non-discriminatory behavior, to
meaningful relationships, to psychological well-being, to em-
ployment, and to a decent wage.
One basic problem with so-called positive "rights" is that
they are not really rights at all. Rather, they are aspects of
wealth, or power, or control over the environment. To illus-
trate the stark differences between the two very dissimilar
concepts of rights, they will be contrasted in several
dimensions.
A. Environmental Dependency
Negative rights are independent of time, space, location
and condition. They apply right now, but they were just as
appropriate and pertinent ten thousand years ago. They are
completely independent of circumstances. It was a rights vio-
lation for one caveman to club another over the head in pre-
historic times; this will hold true for spacemen ten thousand
years in the future.
In contrast, positive "rights" are highly environmentally
dependent. If people have a positive "right" to food, there
must be food available, otherwise they will be deprived of
their rights. And this may be impossible in certain eras (dur-
ing the seven "lean years" of the Bible), climates (the Arctic),
or locations (the Sahara). Comparatively, for negative rights
to be respected, people must only refrain from initiatory
violence.
B. Good Will
Only an act of will on the part of all people is necessary
for negative rights to be entrenched. If the earth's entire
population suddenly resolved never again to engage in the
first use of force, all negative rights violations would come to
an end, in one fell swoop.
But this is not the case with positive rights. We may all
be of the best will in the world, and yet not succeed in deliv-
ering the goods and services required to satisfy all positive




Negative rights are unchanging. They have always been
precisely the same as they are right now and will always re-
main so. Positive "rights" are subject to change, depending
upon the never stable definition of "decency" or "minimum
standards." People began to have "rights" to indoor plumb-
ing, varieties in food, refrigerators, and television sets only
after they became available. They have always had the right
not to be the target of aggression.
D. Agency
Only another human being can violate negative
rights-by launching force against an innocent person. Both
humans and nature, however, can violate positive "rights."
People can do so, of course, by refusing to give of themselves
and their property that which is due to others according to
this doctrine. But nature can continue to undermine positive
"rights" as well. Storms, floods, frosts, avalanches, volcanoes,
meteors, fires, and other acts of God can deprive people of
the satisfaction of their positive "rights." None of these trag-
edies are even relevant to negative rights.
E. Game Theory
Negative rights are reminiscent of a positive sum game,
in that if one person suddenly attains an increase in his nega-
tive rights (fewer people for some reason aggress against him,
or do so to a lesser degree) there need not necessarily be a
diminution in the negative rights enjoyed by anyone else.17
The economic analogue of the positive sum game is trade,
where both parties to a commercial arrangement gain at least
in the ex ante sense-otherwise they would not have agreed
to participate.
67. Tom Bethell incorrectly applies this insight to voting rights:
"Extending the right Ito voteJ to more people [such as blacks, who were
previously disenfranchisedj would not take it away from the previously en-
franchised. This same reason applies, obviously, to free speech, the free-
dom to worship, the right to bear arms, etc." AM. SPECTATOR,July 1982, at
14. This argument does apply to free speech, worship, the right to bear
arms and other negative liberties (the right to do anything one
wishes-except to initiate force) but it does not apply to voting, which is a
positive, not a negative right. We can see this when we realize that al-
though the previously enfranchised can still vote, the effectiveness of their
ballot has now become diluted. Nor is this a mere academic quibble with
no real world implication-as the present South African crisis will attest.
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The paradigm case of the zero sum game is poker. Here,
unless there is something very strange indeed going on, the
winnings and losings of the various players must exactly can-
cel out one another. Hence, the zero sum game-which is
evocative of positive "rights." Thus, if one person's rights to
clothing or shelter, for example, are enhanced, then those of




Under a regime of positive "rights," it is not merely diffi-
cult to give charity to the poor, it is logically impossible. Even
if the donor intends that his offering be charitable, it cannot
be. If this philosophy of the bishops' pastoral is correct, the
poor recipient has a right to (part of) the wealth of the rich
person who, in turn, has an obligation to hand it over.
The relation between donor and recipient can no longer
be one of giver and receiver of charity. The poor recipient
now approaches the rich donor not in the stance of making a
request, but with the demeanor of a bill collector who is set-
tling a debt. If the rich man refuses to make the payment, the
poor one need not plead with him, as for alms; now, armed
with positive "rights," he can demand that the wealthy per-
son fulfill his "obligation." In contrast, if only negative rights
are operational, then charity is logically legitimate-as com-
mon sense indicates it to be.
The bishops cannot have it both ways. They can
purchase positive "rights," but only at the cost of charity. But
if they opt for the latter, they can no longer ask for
tithes-they must present bills.
G. Occam's Razor
Several perfectly good phrases convey what positive
"rights" are meant to communicate: wealth, power, riches.
The additional and complex terminology of positive "rights"
only serves to confuse matters. The scientific laws of parsi-
mony known under the rubric "Occam's Razor" are suffi-
cient to rule this out of court.'
68. Note that police protection, even though primarily used to en-
hance negative rights, is itself a resource, an aspect of wealth, and thus an
instance of positive "rights." If one person has been accorded more police
protection, another person must be given less.
69. Behind the use of positive "rights," of course, is the attempt to
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H. Incumbency
Who is responsible for carrying out the obligations im-
posed on people by the two alternative views under consider-
ation? With negative rights, the answer is clear: everyone
must refrain from engaging in physical coercion. There are
no exceptions.
Matters are far less clear with positive "rights." Who
must share their wealth with the less fortunate-people in
the same nation? Do those in the same state, city, county or
borough have an obligation to share?
One answer is that everyone is obligated to share with
those who are less fortunate. But this is a truly radical idea,
and would empower foreigners to present themselves at our
shores and not simply request that we divide our wealth with
them, but demand it.
I. Degree
The degree to which these rights must be respected is
yet another dimension upon which the two doctrines widely
diverge. In the case of real rights (i.e., negative
rights-which is a redundancy), absolute compliance is re-
quired. One is forbidden to physically aggress against other
people even slightly. 7° One cannot touch even "a hair on
their heads."''7 But this has no implication for the distribu-
tion of income, because it is irrelevant to the concerns of
negative rights.
What about the case of positive rights? How far must the
redistribution process go? We are never vouchsafed an an-
swer in the bishops' pastoral; thus, we can only speculate.
The only philosophically satisfactory answer to this question
wrest from the concept of rights some of its luster, and apply it to the
otherwise less savory policy of coercively transferring income from rich to
poor.
70. Why is only physical aggression proscribed? Why not psychologi-
cal damage, or "mental cruelty?" The short answer is that violations of law
prohibiting physical coercion deserve jail sentences; people who engage in
psychological "evasiveness," or meanness, are typically guilty of no more
than the exercise of their (negative) rights of free speech in ways to which
someone objects. For an account of the dividing line between aggression
and non-aggression, and for an explication of the natural rights philoso-
phy, see R. NOZICK, supra note 54; M. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY
(1982).
71. For an analysis of how rights philosophy is applied to matters of
ecology, environmentalism and external diseconomies, see Rothbard, Law,
Property Rights and Air Pollution, 2 CATO J. 55 (1982).
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is that the process must continue until absolute income/
wealth equality has been achieved. 2 If the reason for the
process itself is inequality, then as long as any vestige of ine-




The implications for the scope of government in the two
alternative rights philosophies are also very different. No-
vak's views on this question are definitive:
The concept of economic rights undermines the American
idea of the limited state. Civil and political rights prevent
the state from blocking God-given, inalienable rights. But
economic rights empower the state to take positive actions,
including the establishment of definitions, conditions, and
procedures which beneficiaries must meet, and the seizing
of powers over the economy necessary to meet them. This
logically takes the form (in China) of population controls;
(in the USSR) of mandatory displacement of the unem-
ployed to employment as the state directs (in Siberia, e.g.);
and (in Poland) of control over political life by control over
all employment. Economic rights inevitably increase the
power of the state.
7 4
In contrast, negative rights contemplate a very limited
government. Indeed, the classical liberals saw the protection
of (negative) liberties as the main and most important func-
tion of their "night watchman" state.
K. Punishment
Violators of (negative) rights are commonly punished by
the imposition of fines and, for serious offenses, by jail
sentences or even the death penalty. An entire literature ex-
72. See Levin, Negative Liberty, 2 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 84 (1984).
73. T'he logic of the view put forth in the bishops' pastoral implies a
"Brave New World" type of horror as well, given only the availability of
the appropriate technology. Suppose there were machines which could
transfer intelligence, or beauty, or serenity, or happiness, or even religious
appreciation from one person to another. If those who are "rich" in these
attributes really have an obligation to share with the less fortunate, they
must be grabbed, kicking and screaming if need be, and forced to enter
these personality-redistributing machines, no matter how personally shat-
tering the experience might be.
74. Novak, supra note 22, at 9.
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ists on the tailoring of punishments to fit the particular
crime.
75
No such thing exists, to say the least, in the case of posi-
tive "rights" violations. Indeed, the whole idea is abhorrent.
The idea of punishing people for not living up to these so-
called obligations is repugnant (especially when it is unclear
which specific rich individuals are responsible for giving sus-
tenance to which particular poor people).7 6 And yet the con-
coction of such a theory is a necessary condition for making
any sense out of the doctrine of positive "rights." This fail-
ure sheds doubt on whether its proponents take their own
theory seriously.
L. Rights Conflicts
Two different rights can only conflict in the case of posi-
tive "rights." Here, one person's boundaries can extend well
into those of another. And when rights overlap, there is con-
flict-and one, the other, or both of the "rights" must be
abrogated.
In the case mentioned by the bishops, the "rights" of
third world countries to export their goods to the United
States are incompatible with the "rights" of domestic work-
ers to keep their jobs and produce the items at a higher
cost.77 One cannot possibly respect both sets of positive
"rights." This leads to the conclusion that one, the other, or
both may not be rights at all.
In contrast, there is no such possibility of conflict in the
realm of negative rights. The right of A not to be a target of
aggression cannot conflict with the identical right of B.
M. Egalitarianism
Given the presumption of equality in the area of rights
(we all have equal rights before the law), the recognition of
positive rights leads ineluctably to egalitarianism. If we all
75. It will do no good to reply that government, through the tax
and welfare system, should organize matters so that our positive "rights"
obligations are met. For rights violations are an individual matter; specific,
individual people presumably should be penalized if they fail to meet their
responsibilities.
76. See Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, paras. 96, 119, 263, 269. Nor is
the lay letter free of this verbiage. See, e.g., Lay Letter, supra note 20, at 23,
38, 59.
77. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, paras. 297, 300. See Second Draft,
supra note 11, paras. 263-64.
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have equal positive "rights," and positive "rights" are simply
synonyms for wealth, then income equality is justified.
Needless to say, no such presumption of egalitarianism
applies to negative rights. To be sure, we all have an equal
right not to be coerced, but since this has nothing to do with
wealth, egalitarianism cannot be deduced from such a system.
In summary, the two concepts of rights are quite differ-
ent. There is of course no law against couching a demand for
wealth redistribution in "rights" language, but this does con-
fuse matters. We can say if we wish that positive "rights" are
rights, but we must keep in mind that the two versions of
rights are greatly at odds with one another; thus this usage
can only spread confusion.
III. ECONOMICS
In Part Two of the bishops' pastoral, the section devoted
to policy applications, the bishops address themselves to nu-
merous issues of economics. This commentary shall deal with
employment, poverty and economic justice.
A. Unions
It is not difficult to document the fact that the bishops'
pastoral champions unionism as commonly practiced in the
United States. Indeed, the sections of the letter dealing with
this "curious institution" are virtually nothing but paeans of
praise.78 The bishops go so far as to invite unions to organize
their own employees.7 9 If anything, however, the lay letter is
even more vociferous in its flattery of the U.S. union move-
ment. It exults in the fact that the Catholic church has been a
long-time and faithful supporter,80 a dubious distinction
indeed.
78. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, paras. 111-14, 181. See Second
Draft, supra note 11, paras. 103-106, 158.
79. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 148. See Second Draft, supra
note 11, para. 323. Have they anticipated the likelihood that this might
encourage the picketing of church services? For an instance of this behav-
ior, see And on the Seventh Day, God Was Picketed, North Shore News, April
5, 1981, at 1.
80. See Lay Letter, supra note 20, at 35-37; Kennedy, supra note 28,
at 26. Novak, moreover, had the intestinal fortitude to publicize the fact
that "Lane Kirkland kindly telephoned us to thank us for our strong sup-
port of labor unions, and Monsignor George Higgins of the bishops' staff,
to his credit, wrote a column lauding our treatment of unions as one of the
best of its sort he had seen in his lifetime." Novak, The Bishops and the Poor,
COMMENTARY, May 1985, at 20.
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The bishops' major reason for their support of American
unionism is that "employers frequently possess greater bar-
gaining power than do employees in the negotiation of wage
agreements. Such unequal power may press workers into a
choice between an inadequate wage and no wage at all.""1
But this rather seriously misconstrues the process of wage de-
termination. In a free labor market, wages are basically set by
the marginal revenue productivity 2 of the employee-not on
the basis of bargaining power, scale of enterprises, or size of
labor units. If bargaining power correctly explained wage
rates, remuneration would be negatively correlated with the
concentration ratio; that is, industries with fewer employees
would pay lower wages than ones with many-and wages
would be unrelated to measures of productivity such as edu-
cational attainment. Needless to say, no evidence for this con-
tention exists.
The lay letter also articulates "full support for the princi-
ple of free and voluntary association in labor unions."83 But
this is disingenuous. It is not even a rough approximation of
how organized labor has and still continues to operate in the
United States.
There are two kinds of unions possible. First, there are
those which do all that they can to raise their members'
wages and working conditions-except violate the (negative)
rights of other people by initiating violence against them.
These can be called "voluntary unions." Second are those
unions which do all that they can to promote their members'
welfare-up to and including the use of physical brutality
aimed at non-aggressing individuals.
With regard to the activity of coercive unions as defined
above, Ludwig von Mises has stated:
In all countries the labor unions have actually acquired
the privilege of violent action. The governments have aban-
doned in their favor the essential attribute of government,
the exclusive power and right to resort to violent coercion
and compulsion. Of course, the laws which make it a crimi-
nal offense for any citizen to resort-except in case of self-
81. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 110. See Second Draft, supra
note 11, para. 102.
82. See C. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMic THEORY 393-425 (1972); J.
HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 1-21 (2d ed. 1963); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY
OF PRICE 187-203 (1962); A. STONIER & D. HAGUE, A TEXTBOOK OF Eco-
NOMIC THEORY ch. 11 (1964).
83. Lay Letter, supra note 20, at 36.
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defense-to violent action have not been formally repealed
or amended. However, actual labor union violence is toler-
ated within broad limits. The labor unions are practically
free to prevent by force anybody from defying their orders
concerning wage rates and other labor conditions. They are
free to inflict with impunity bodily evils upon strikebreakers
and upon entrepreneurs and mandataries of entrepreneurs
who employ strike breakers. They are free to destroy prop-
erty of such employers and even to injure customers pa-
tronizing their shops. The authorities, with the approval of
public opinion, condone such acts. The police do not stop
such offenders, the state attorneys do not arraign them, and
no opportunity is offered to the penal courts' to pass judg-
ment on their actions. In excessive cases, if the deeds of vio-
lence go too far, some lame and timid attempts at repres-
sion and prevention are ventured. But as a rule they fail.
Their failure is sometimes due to bureaucratic inefficiency
or to the insufficiency of the means at the disposal of the
authorities, but more often it is due to the unwillingness of
the whole governmental apparatus to interfere
successfully."
84. L. VoN MisEs, supra note 51, at 777-78. Von Mises further states:
what is euphemistically called collective bargaining by union lead-
ers and "pro-labor" legislation is of a quite different character. It
is bargaining at the point of a gun. It is bargaining between an
armed party, ready to use its weapons, and an unarmed party
under duress. It is not a market transaction. It is a dictate forced
upon the employer. And its effects do not differ from those of a
government decree for the enforcement of which the police
power and the penal courts are used. It produces institutional
unemployment.
The treatment of the problems involved by public opinion and
the vast number of pseudo-economic writings is utterly misleading.
TI'he issue is not the right to form associations. It is whether or not
any association of private citizens should be granted the privilege
of resorting with impunity to violent action. It is the same prob-
lem that relates to the activities of the Ku Klux Klan.
Neither is it correct to look upon the matter from the point of
view of a "right to strike." The problem is not the right to strike,
but the right-by intimidation or violence-to force other people
to strike, and the further right to prevent anybody from working
in a shop in which a union has called a strike. When the unions
invoke the right to strike in justification of such intimidation and
deeds of violence, they are on no better ground than a religious
group would be in invoking the right of freedom of conscience as
a justification of persecuting dissenters.
When in the past the laws of some countries denied to employ-
ees the right to form unions, they were guided by the idea that
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In the view of Friedrich Hayek:
It cannot be stressed enough that the coercion which un-
ions have been permitted to exercise contrary to all princi-
ples of freedom under the law is primarily the coercion of
fellow workers. Whatever true coercive power unions may
be able to wield over employers is a consequence of this pri-
mary power of coercing other workers; the coercion of em-
ployers would lose most of its objectionable character if un-
ions were deprived of this power to exact unwilling support.
Neither the right of voluntary agreement between workers
nor even their right to withhold their services in concert is
in question."5
Coercive union violence in the United States (and other
countries) is directed at the innocent people at the bottom of
the employment ladder, the least, last, and lost of us. The
bishops, in their principle of the preferential option for the
poor, ask us to take particular concern for the welfare of
these individuals. These individuals are, in a word, the
"scabs."
Now scabs have received very bad press. Even the appel-
lation ascribed to them is one of derogation. But when all the
loose and inaccurate verbiage is stripped away, the scab is no
more than a poor person, often unskilled, uneducated, unem-
ployed, perhaps a member of a minority group, who seeks
only to enter the labor market,8 6 and there to offer his ser-
such unions had no objective other than to resort to violent action
and intimidation. When the authorities in the past sometimes di-
rected their armed forces to protect the employers, their mandata-
ries, and their property against the onslaught of strikers, they
were not guilty of acts hostile to "labor." They simply did what
every government considers its main duty. They tried to preserve
their exclusive right to resort to violent action.
Id. at 779.
85. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 269 (1960). See also S.
PETRO, THE LABOR POLICY OF THE FREE SOCIETY (1957); R. POUND, LEGAL
IMMUNITIES OF LABOR UNIONS (1957). According to Morgan 0. Reynolds,
"Hitting a person over the head with a baseball bat is much less likely to be
treated as criminal if the person wielding the bat is an organized (i.e. un-
ionized) worker in a labor dispute." M. REYNOLDS, POWER AND PRIVILEGE:
LABOR UNIONS IN AMERICA 50 (1984).
86. It is sometimes alleged that the union is justified in visiting vio-
lence upon the scab, since the scab initiates coercion by daring to "steal"
the job "owned" by the organized worker in the first place. But this claim
cannot withstand analysis. The employed worker no more owns "his" job
than does the outsider. An employment contract is simply a contract be-
tween two willing parties; neither party can own it. In a free society, a soci-
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vices to the highest bidder.
In fact, it is no exaggeration to consider the scab the eco-
nomic equivalent of the leper. And we all know the treat-
ment of lepers urged upon us by ecclesiastical and biblical
authorities.8"
In their excessively pro (coercive) union stance, the au-
thors of both the bishops' pastoral and the lay letter expose
themselves as untrue to the morally axiomatic principle of
the preferential option of the poor. The "poor," in this case,
are not the princes of labor, organized into gigantic, power-
ful and coercive unions. Rather, they are the despised, down-
trodden and denigrated scabs. But if "poor" in this case is
interpreted as referring to coercively unionized workers, not
scabs, then the principle of the preferential option for the
poor is being seriously misinterpreted.
This commentary does not argue against the legitimacy
of voluntary unions, those which restrict themselves to mass
walkouts and other non-invasive activity. The only difficulty
is that in modern day America, there are no such entities.
B. Wages
The muddied waters of wage theory into which the bish-
ops have launched themselves will now be considered. On
several occasions, scattered throughout the pastoral letter,
they put themselves on record as calling for "just wages,""
or "adequate remuneration." 89
One of the greatest intellectual tragedies of the Church,
one from which religious institutions are only now beginning
to recover, is the medieval debate concerning the "just
price." Evocative of questions such as "how many angels can
dance on the tip of a pin," the "just price" controversy is well
on the way toward being resolved. And the answer? The just
price for an item is any payment agreed upon by any pair of
buyers and sellers.
ety of contract, not of status, each person is free to enter the labor market
and compete with all others. The unionized, employed worker is no more
justified in utilizing violence to restrict the scab's entry into the job market
than the scab would be in employing initiatory force against the organized
laborer.
87. See Block, Liberation Theology, GRAIL, Sept. 1985, at 75. See also
W. BLOCK, DEFENDING THE UNDEFENDABLE 237-41 (1976).
88. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 110. See The Church and Capi-
talism, supra note 3, at 107.
89. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, outline, para. 77. See Second Draft,
supra note 11, para. 77.
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Now that the "just price" wars have been happily con-
signed to the dustbin of history, a fate they so richly deserve,
another equally trivial contention has come along to again
threaten the intellectual probity of ecclesiastical organiza-
tions, this one over "just wages." Hopefully, this will soon go
the way of the other, and we shall be left with the similar
result that the just wage is any level of remuneration mutu-
ally acceptable to an employer and employee.
But this, unfortunately, will have to overcome the con-
trary efforts of the bishops. In their view, "Labor is not sim-
ply a commodity traded on the open market nor is a just
wage determined simply by the level the market will
sustain."90
This will not do, however. To be sure, labor is not sim-
ply a commodity like any other. For one thing, it cannot le-
gally be traded, only rented. The question is, what reason do
the bishops put forth to justify their contention that a just
wage is not that reached on the open market? The answer is,
none. Thus, the epistemological status of labor is a red her-
ring. Given that labor is not a commodity like others, we still
have no case against considering the market wage as the just
wage.
Another problem is the bishops' failure to precisely de-
fine the just wage. They only assert what it is not, namely the
market wage-the one agreed upon by two consenting par-
ties. Yet it is obligatory upon the bishops, because they are
putting forth a claim, to elucidate what it is, not what it is not.
Let us assert, for the sake of argument, that the just
wage is always 120% of the market wage. That is, all workers
are presently being exploited to the tune of twenty percent of
their wages. Do not cavil at the arbitrariness of any such pro-
posal; instead, consider this more a fundamental objection to
any specification of the just wage (apart from the market
wage, whatever it is).
Suppose that someone willingly, happily and voluntarily
wants to work for less than the "just wage." Suppose, that is,
that a church employee wants to make a contribution to his
employer, in effect, in the form of a salary cut. One writer
plaintively asks, "whether the dedication of Christians who
work for less than a 'just wage' is now to be deemed immoral.
That would be a not-so-delicate break from the Christian his-
90. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 110. See Second Draft, supra
note 11, para. 102.
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tory of radical vocation." 91 It would also be equivalent to the
claim that charity is immoral-when given by the worker to
his boss in the form of a decrease in pay.
C. Unemployment
Unfortunately, the bishops do not address the major
cause of unemployment, which is legislation that artificially
boosts wages above the productivity levels of workers to
whom they apply.93 Examples include the minimum wage
law, labor codes which enable unions to "bargain" to this
end, and enactments such as the Davis-Bacon Act which also
lift wages above free market levels."3
It is highly disconcerting that the bishops' analysis of the
causes of unemployment never considers government legisla-
tion of this sort as the possible culprit. It is not as if the bish-
ops had never heard of the instances of this phenomenon,
such as the minimum wage law.94 This omission is particu-
larly disappointing in view of their statement that, "Among
black teenagers aged 16 to 19 who are seeking jobs unem-
ployment reaches the tragic figure of 41.7 percent, while for
blacks aged 20 to 24 it is a discouraging 26.3 percent."9 The
bishops are correctly concerned with this state of affairs,
since unemployed black youths certainly qualify for coverage
under the principle of the preferential option for the poor.
But minimum wage legislation strikes particularly at young
blacks.
In reply to a question as to whether some groups are
more hurt by the minimum wage than others, Milton Fried-
man stated:
Yes, indeed. Take Negro teenagers, for example. We all
know the terrible social problems being caused, especially in
91. The Bishops and Economic Democracy, supra note 27, at B8. Our
just-wage-as-market-wage hypothesis, it will be appreciated, is immune
from this objection. For the market wage is the final level of pay accepted
by the person seeking a salary cut. Thus, even in this case, the market and
the "just" wage must always be equal.
92. The crux of the bishops' position on unemployment can be
found in Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, paras. 168-70. See Second Draft,
supra note 11, paras. 143-48.
93. See W. WILLIAMS, supra note 47.
94. The minimum wage is specifically mentioned, but not in the
context of unemployment creation. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 210.
See Second Draft, supra note 11, para. 196.
95. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 162. See Second Draft, supra
note 11, para. 139.
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our large cities, by the high rate of unemployment among
Negro teenagers. The fact is-it can be demonstrated sta-
tistically-the minimum wage rate is a major cause of Ne-
gro teenage unemployment. Of all the laws on the statute
books of this country, I believe the minimum wage law
probably does the Negroes the most harm. It is not in-
tended to be an anti-Negro law but, in fact, it is.9
This finding has been reached in literally hundreds, 'if
not thousands, of scholarly books, articles, and Ph.D. the-
ses.9 7 Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that of all
economic propositions, the one which states that "A mini-
mum wage increases unemployment among young and un-
skilled workers" is among those that would receive the most
assent from economists.9
It is greatly regretted that the bishops did not mention
governmental policies which artificially force up wages in
connection with the creation of unemployment. This omis-
sion is so serious that it casts doubt on the value of much of
their work on this subject.
D. Poverty
In the passage of the letter which has perhaps been
quoted more widely than any other, the bishops state:
If the United States were a country in which poverty ex-
isted amid relatively equitable income distribution, one might
argue that we do not have the resources to provide every-
one with an adequate living. But, in fact, this is a country
marked by glaring disparities of wealth and income. As noted
earlier Catholic social teaching does not suggest that abso-
lute equality in the distribution of income and wealth is re-
quired. Some degree of inequality is not only acceptable, but
may be desirable for economic and social reasons. However,
gross inequalities are morally unjustifiable, particularly when
millions lack even the basic necessities of life. In our judg-
ment, the distribution of income and wealth in the United
States is so inequitable that it violates this minimum standard
96. Y. BROZEN & M. FRIEDMAN, THE MINIMUM WAGE RATE: WHO RE-
ALLY PAYS? 10-11 (1966).
97. See, e.g., W. BLOCK, supra note 39, at 45-55, 66.
98. This precise question was put to a sample of 211 U.S. econo-
mists; 87.79, either "generally agreed" or "agreed with provisions." Grey,
Pommerehne, Schneider & Gilbert, Concensus and Dissension Among Econo-
mists: An Empirical Inquiry, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 986, 991 (1984).
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of distributive justice.99
There are grave problems with this claim.100 Note the
different descriptions of inequality in the above passage: "rel-
atively equitable," "glaring disparities of. . . equity," "some
degree of inequality," "gross inequities," and "so inequita-
ble." One difficulty is that equality is a quantitative measure
(e.g., the Gini coefficient) and yet the bishops only describe it
in qualitative terms. How could one, even in principle, test
the bishops' charge that the U.S. income distribution is ineq-
uitable? Suppose the government follows the bishops' advice
and implements their proposals. How shall we know when we
have reached that "some degree" of inequity which is not
only "acceptable," even "desirable?" We shall not. There-
fore, the charge as it now stands is operationally meaningless.
This could of course be easily rectified. The bishops only
need to specify some numerical measure of inequality, above
which is improper, and below which is proper. But in so do-
ing, they may open themselves up to the objection of arbi-
trariness. Why the specified cut off point or range? How
could it be defended that some measured distributions are
"immoral" and others "moral?"
But the chief difficulty is that justice (or injustice) does
not properly apply to income distributions. Rather, it applies
to the process through which incomes are earned and distrib-
uted. If this process is just, whatever results is necessarily
proper; if the process is unjust, no possible result can be
proper.
Robert Nozick eloquently demonstrates the futility of
looking for justice among end state theories of income distri-
bution. Let DI be defined as that distribution of income,
whatever it is, which the bishops deem to be just. Nozick
99. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 202 (emphasis added). See Sec-
ond Draft, supra note 11, para. 183.
100. A minor shortcoming is that the bishops base their abhorrence
of the present income distribution on the understanding that "[i]n 1982
the richest 20 percent of Americans received more income than the bot-
tom 70 percent combined and nearly as much as all other Americans com-
bined. The poorest 20 percent of the people received only about 4 percent
of the nation's income while the poorest 40 percent received only 13 per-
cent." Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 202. But these calculations ignore
the value of non-cash benefits to the poor, thus biasing their figures toward
greater inequality. See Novak, Blaming America: A Comment on Paragraphs
202-204 of the First Draft, CATHOLICISM IN CRISIS, July, 1985, at 12, 13. For
a further correction of the bishops' calculations of wealth distribution, see




If DI was a just distribution, and people voluntarily moved
from it to D2, transferring parts of their shares they were
given under D1 (what was it for if not to do something
with?), isn't D2 also just? . . . [N]o end-state principle or
distributional patterned principle of justice can be continu-
ously realized without continuous interference with people's
lives. Any favored pattern would be transformed into one
unfavored by the principle, by people choosing to act in va-
rious ways; for example, by people exchanging goods and
services with other people, or giving things to other people,
things the transferors are entitled to under the favored dis-
tributional pattern. To maintain a pattern one must either
continually interfere to stop people from transferring re-
sources as they wish, or continually (or periodically) inter-
fere to take from some persons resources that others for
some reason chose to transfer to them.101
Another objection can be made to the bishops' call for a
redistribution of income within the United States. It violates
not one but two of the pastoral's principles: the preferential
option for the poor, and the idea that we are all God's crea-
tures, regardless of our political and citizenship allegiance.
102
The important thing to realize is that there are literally
no poor people in the United States-poverty line or no pov-
erty line-in the context of poverty elsewhere in the
world.103 The people at the bottom of the economic pyramid
in America would be considered middle class-even upper
middle class-if they and their economic lifestyles could be
transported somehow to the more desperate areas of the
world, such as Ethiopia or Bangladesh. Thus, the bishops' call
for additional wealth transfers from the rich to the poor in
the United States is-in the global context-really a demand
101. R. NozicK, supra note 54, at 160-63. Paul Heyne also makes this
vital moral distinction between process and end state: "The justice or injus-
tice of a social system will not be found in the patterns of outcomes it yields
- its end states - but in the procedures through which those end states
emerge." P. HEYNE, supra note 42, at 10. It should be noted, however, that
several of the bishops' critics accept their equation of a more equal income
distribution with morality. See, e.g., Novak, supra note 101, at 13, where
the degree of income equality which has been attained in the United States
is seen as a "significant achievement."
102. Pastoral Letter, supra note 1, para. 273. See Second Draft, supra
note 11, paras. 310, 312.
103. The bishops are well aware of this fact. See Pastoral Letter, supra
note 1, paras. 274, 276.
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that income be shifted from the wealthy to the middle class.
Were there a "preferential option for the middle class," this
policy might make sense, but it is very difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to reconcile it with a preferential option for the poor.
Therefore, even on the bishops' own grounds, even if it were
not immoral to forcibly transfer funds in the manner advo-
cated by the pastoral letter, this policy still would not be
justified.
IV. CONCLUSION
This commentary concludes with a brief venture into the
realm of theology, which is sure to be fraught with all sorts of
dangers, both spiritual and temporal.
The last sentence of the bishops' pastoral reads as fol-
lows: "In this love and friendship God is glorified and God's
grandeur revealed."1"4 Consider for a moment only the final
three words. Where else is "God's grandeur revealed?"
Clerics, ecclesiastics, and religious people have seen the
work of the Lord in numerous realms: in mathematics, in bi-
ology, in physics, in painting, in sculpture, in sunsets, in the
perfection of diamonds. In all of these areas, people have
seen great beauty, and much complexity coupled with a sim-
plicity so serene that it appears as if the hand of a Higher
Power is at work. In the movie Amadeus, Salieri said "If God
spoke to man, it would be through the music of Mozart."
And in the movie Chariots of Fire, one of the protagonists said
that the grandeur of God is revealed in foot races.
God, in short, is everywhere, in this view. And this leads
to a final criticism of the bishops' pastoral.' There is no ap-
preciation, in this document, that the hand of a Greater Be-
ing is also at work in the free market. There is no recogni-
tion that the "invisible hand," too, is part of God's plan.
There is no awe, not even any recognition, of the magical,
spiritual dimension, of the pure pristine beauty, of the mar-
ketplace.10 6 This, perhaps, is the greatest flaw of the bishops'
pastoral.
104. Id. para. 333.
105. I owe this point to Dr. Jim Johnston, of Standard Oil and Eco-
nomic Education for the Clergy, Inc.
106. I trust it will be seen as no more idolatrous to perceive the hand
of God in the free enterprise system, than to see it in mathematics, music,
or athletics.
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